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Nothing like …falling…  
©Susan Melrose  
“Pure, senseless contingency…”. B. Massumii 
Fig 1.  Cornelis Cornelisz, The Fall of Ixion, (1588). The common bond of the series of four fallers 
(Ixion, Icarus, Phateon and Tantalus) or four disgracers, is that each one tried to enter the realm of 
the gods and was punished for his hubris. Ixion was punished for his arrogance by being doomed to 
rotate for eternity on a burning wheel. ii 
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Fig 2. The Italian tightrope walker and acrobatic dancer, Sacchi, in Eugenio Barba and 
Nicola Savarese, The Secret Art of the Performer: A Dictionary of Theatre Anthropology, 
Routledge 1991, pp.34-48: “A whole series of tensions is set up just to keep [her] body 
from falling.” 
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fall (n.) 
c. 1200, "a falling to the ground; a dropping from a height, a descent from a higher to a lower 
position (as by gravity); a collapsing of a building," from the source of fall (n.). (Old English noun 
fealle meant "snare, trap.") Meaning "a sinking down, subsidence" Of the coming of night from 
1650s. Meaning "downward direction of a surface" is from 1560s, of a value from 1550s. Theological 
sense, "a succumbing to sin or temptation" (especially of Adam and Eve) is from early 13c. 
fall (v.) 
Old English feallan (class VII strong verb; past tense feoll, past participle feallen) "to drop from a 
height; fail, decay, die," from Proto-Germanic *fallan (source also of Old Frisian falla, Old Saxon 
fallan, Dutch vallen, Old Norse falla, Old High German fallan, German fallen, absent in Gothic).  
These are from PIE root *pol- "to fall" (source also of Armenian p'ul "downfall," Lithuanian puola "to 
fall," Old Prussian aupallai "finds," literally "falls upon").  
Meaning "come suddenly to the ground" is from late Old English. Of darkness, night, from c. 1600; of 
land sloping from 1570s; of prices from 1570s. Of empires, governments, etc., from c. 1200. Of the 
face or countenance from late 14c. Meaning "to be reduced" (as temperature) is from 1650s. 
Meaning "die in battle" is from 1570s. Meaning "to pass casually (into some condition)" is from early 
13c.  
To fall in "take place or position" is from 1751. To fall in love is attested from 1520s; to fall asleep is 
late 14c. To fall down is early 13c. (a-dun follon); to fall behind is from 1856. Fall through "fail, come 
to nothing" is from 1781. To fall for something is from 1903.  
To fall out is by mid-13c. in a literal sense; military use is from 1832. Meaning "have a disagreement, 
begin to quarrel" is attested from 1560s (to fall out with "quarrel with" is from late 15c.). 
Falling (fälʹĭng; /ˈfɔːlɪŋ/ˈfɑlɪŋ/); present participle of fall 
 
Falling (adj.) 
 
present-participle adjective from fall (v.). Falling star is from 1560s; falling off "decrease, declining" is 
from c. 1600. Falling evil "epilepsy" is from early 13c. 
 
fallen (adj.) 
c. 1400, past-participle adjective from fall (v.). Used figuratively for "morally ruined" by 1620s, from 
the verb in the sense "yield to temptation" (especially in reference to women and chastity), attested 
from c. 1200. Meaning "those who have died" attested by 1765. Fallen angel is from 1680s; fallen 
woman by 1748.iii 
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Fig 3. Gildas Bourdet’s Le Pain dur, by Claudel, Le Théâtre de la Salamandre, 1984: 
Turelure, the father, dies, apparently of fright, falling downstairs. 
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Falling – isn’t it the strangest thing?  And doesn’t the word itself belong, etymologically, to 
the richest field (variously, above, ‘attack[ing]’, ‘decay[ing]’, ‘forgiv[ing]’, ‘salut[ing]’, 
‘yield[ing]’, ‘deceiv[ing]…)?  I trip, I stumble, I tumble, gravity takes my body into and 
through the air … I am falling… somewhere… my brain shakes and quivers within the bony 
casing, and the resulting head wound is boggy and seeping.  Oh!  Where is my breath?  
Was I breathing, when I fell – as I fell?  It seems to come back, suddenly, when I land on 
the floor.  Clunk.  I bump to a halt against the closed wooden door.  Where had my breath 
gone?  Who have I offended?  Was my breath simply suspended – fine word, suspended! – 
as the falling starts?  But where does it start?  What triggers it?  Doesn’t it start, not with my 
agency at all, but with gravity, and the “downward acceleration of terrestrial bodies”?  I am 
terrestrial, unable to fly, godless, indeed, and is it hubris that ‘falls me’,’ befalls me’, ‘fells 
me’, ‘deceives me’ … or is it gravity, that laughs? 
gravity (n.) 
c. 1500, "weight, dignity, seriousness, solemnity of deportment or character, importance", from Old 
French gravité "seriousness, thoughtfulness" (13c.) and directly from Latin gravitatem (nominative 
gravitas) "weight, heaviness, pressure," from gravis "heavy" (from PIE root *gwere-(1) "heavy"). The 
scientific sense of "downward acceleration of terrestrial bodies due to gravitation of the Earth" first 
recorded 1620s.iv 
“The words gravity and gravitation have been more or less confounded”, adds the 
dictionary, “but the most careful writers use gravitation for the attracting force, and gravity 
for the terrestrial phenomenon of weight or downward acceleration” which consists of both 
gravitation and centrifugal force. v 
 
Is it gravity at work, or does falling start with the gods, as in Cornelis Cornelisz’s, The Fall of 
Ixion (1588) (Fig 1, above)?  Ixion, one of the four ‘fallers’ or disgracers (Ixion, Icarus, 
Phateon and Tantalus), reputedly tried to enter the realm of the gods, mated with a cloud 
and was punished for his hubris, punished for his arrogance and doomed to rotate for 
eternity on a burning wheel.  Which gods, where – and whose gods do I offend?  Didn’t I 
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have, simply, to alter my everyday balance, to “put a foot wrong”, as we sometimes say, in 
a set-up in which normality consists of minor and normally “successful” everyday 
negotiations with spatial constructs?  And isn’t “wrong” interesting, on that basis?   
 
Gildas Bourdet served as director and stage designer for the Théâtre de la Salamandre (Fig 
3, from Claudel’s Le Pain dur, staged in 1984vi),) which means that he both designed the 
stage set-up within which the performers explore the built construct - height, depth and 
gravity - and he made those creative decisions which both celebrate and constrain the 
inventive, expert-intuitivevii play of the actors in the multi-dimensional constructed space-
time (see Figs 3 and 4). 
 
 
Fig 4 Théâtre de La Salamandre, staging Claudel’s Le Pain dur, 1984, at the Théâtre de 
Tourcoing; Gildas Bourdet, metteur en scène and stage designer. 
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That scene, whose particulars we see in Fig 4, establishes a minutely-detailed and 
historically-specific potential for human occupation but also for human elevation and hence 
for falling.  The staircase!  From an unfelt weight that seems to hold me to the earth, to the 
experience of weightlessness:  where are my feet – where is my spine – and my head?!  
Where?  Words fail me.  I am still, there, on the floor, my head butted up against the base 
of the wooden door - as though waiting for something else to happen, but in fact I have 
fallen.  I have fallen.  I whimper.  I am waiting now, because I have fallen, for the world to 
slow and stop, to return to its everyday order.  Pain comes, eventually, with breathing.  
Breathing?  Had my breath stopped?  ‘I held my breath’: the grammatical construct itself 
attributes agency, but surely something else was going on?  Falling held my breath. 
 
Fig 5: programme cover 
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 Fig 6 
Onstage, performance itself holds the performers in visible and in less visible networks of 
energies and values, as do the material scene, the notion of event and its times and spaces, 
as well as the overall direction of the work.  Bourdet notes, referring to the decision-making 
processes involved in making Claudel’s Le Pain dur for the Théâtre de Salamandre (touring 
in France in 1984), that “the conditions for work with the actors mean, unfortunately, that 
you have to become sure of yourself very quickly, and that means that there is not much 
time for uncertainty”.  He spends much less time, he adds, “being uncertain about the 
décor, because I made it myself.”viii  Within this minutely-detailed material construct, which 
holds the performers at work, Bourdet depends upon their expert inventiveness – because 
he can.  (The company became professional in 1972, allowing me to use the qualifiers 
‘expert’ and ‘professional’ without anxiety.) 
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The theatricality of the performers’  work, its gestural clarity, their precise, rapid movement 
– apparently “almost mechanical” – the  intensity of facial expressivity, bordering on the 
grotesque (Figs 3, above, and 7, below), in costumes and make-up that draw solely on the 
limited palette of greys, blacks and white, mean that it is difficult for myself as spectator to 
avoid engaging with it on its own critical terms.  This does not mean, however, that the 
actors’ presence, their evident expertise and play fail to engage in more conventionally 
empathetic terms: the dramatic elements concern an aristocratic family in the late 19thC, 
headed by a widower who had been a revolutionary but who is now an arch-conservative 
industrialist who wants to convert the ancestral home into a paper mill.  The dramatic fiction 
involves a doomed love affair, a son in debt, a Jewish mistress and it unravels around the 
energetic interactions of the five characters.  It is described in terms of alliance and 
misalliance, pushed to the level of bouffonnerie, but it draws, finally, on the myth of 
Oedipus and the death of the fatherix.   
My own interest, since I saw the staging in 1984, lies not only in its staging of corruption, of 
elevation and the endless potential for falling, but in the ways in which the staging doubles 
the myth, played out, with the critical metapractice of an expert company, whose own work, 
in turn, was explicitly discursively-informedx, and the impact of expertise and critical 
discourse on the performance decision-making processes.  Claudel’s Le Pain dur, written at a 
time of early twentieth century radical enquiry, is similarly interrogatory and self-regarding: 
he identifies a godless time, which, logically, can only be grasped if the traces of gods 
remain – hence the finely-detailed grand house interior, with wall-high heroic paintings and 
the fine staircase and fittings. Written between 1913 and 1915, the text stages characters 
who are all, according to Claudel, “des crapules” (scum), inhabiting stately houses rather 
than the gutter; without gods – hence only the traces of what they might have been remain; 
fatherless, and, according to Bourdet himself, a “sinister parody” of humanity, driven from 
within by a sort of mechanical necessity (Bourdet, programme notes), and surely visible in 
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the contortions of the performers’ faces.  What is particularly striking, in his work with the 
performers and the constructed scene, is his insistence on the photographic detail of the 
latter, and the internal conflict of the naturalism of the setting and the theatricality of the 
work of the actors. 
Now, facial expressivity as well as a self-aware body positioning is also key to Cornelis 
Cornelisz’s Ixion (and his fellow betrayers), in Fig 1 above, but expressivity on the face/body 
of the artist’s model can be worked on by the painter, whose choices will have tended 
toward the representational (Ixion is punished, and doomed to rotate for eternity on a 
burning wheel).  By way of contrast, the female tightrope-walker’s face (Fig 2) seems, from 
here, to be relatively expressionless, focused and apparently indifferent to the telescopic 
gaze trained on her underwear; whereas Philippe Petit, whose walk between the Twin 
Towers is reflected on by Chloe Johnston, in “On Not Falling” (2013, Performance Research, 
Vol 18), was “relaxed”, while crossing the space, “his head is turned away…and his eyes 
seem to wander” (Wurmilli 1997 cited by Johnston, p.31).   
Bourdet’s performers’ faces, animated by speaking the complexity of Claudel’s writing, are 
borderline grotesque, bouffonesque, whitened with darkly inscribed facial features.  In each 
of the instances above, affect plays its role, but differently.  Should a spectator feel for the 
(performed) godless dramatic character, for “scum”, for the always already-fallen, the 
clown-faced scurrier, who is also, according to the fiction, a father, a spurned lover, his son 
a swindler - or might I feel, instead or in addition, for the expert performer at work?  Might I 
admire and engage with performance mastery itself, on its own terms?  And if so, what is it 
in the expert-performer’s work that invites a spectator’s affective binding-in - and what is at 
stake if that binding-in fails (or falls)?  In the case of Johnston’s engagement with Phillipe 
Petit’s not falling, she describes his “situation of immediate and astounding risk”, and his 
triumph, as inspiring “an imagined kinaesthesia, a phenomenological response”, even in a 
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secondary audience (p.31), for whom Petit’s “performance [is] called into dialogue with the 
current events of its time” (in the instance concerned, the attack on the Twin Towers, 
11/9/2000, and the “falling man”).  My difficulty with the way in which Johnston and others 
engage with this instance of “not falling” lies in the attempt – Petit’s, it seems, as well as 
Johnston’s ownxi - to account for the exceptional in terms of the everyday: “Like the worker 
at the end of the day who…ambles home relaxed, peaceful and satisfied”.  Myself, I dream 
in the everyday not of flying, but of falling.  My dreams are filled with trepidation and fear. 
According to John Protevi who reviews the affective tradition associated with the work of 
Deleuze and Guattarixii through a more recently developed lens specific to what is called the 
“speculative turn”, affect, (“physiological, psychological, and machinic”, in D&G, 1987),  
“feels its power or potential as it encounters other bodies politic and forms assemblages 
with them (or indeed fails to do so)” (394); affect in D&G, Protevi argues, allows us to 
identify parallels with “novel positions in contemporary cognitive science….which maintain 
that cognition operates in loops among brain, body and environment”(394).  What interests 
John Protevi, from the perspective of this so-called speculative turnxiii, is the observation that 
“both affect and cognition are aspects of a single process, affective cognition, as the 
directed action of a living being in its world”(395).  I want to identify the expert 
performance practitioner’s work in terms first of an expert-intuitive affective cognition, and 
second, borrowing from Porotevi, above, of quite specific and widely ranging “directed 
action[s] of a living [practitioner] in her or his [performance and dramatic] world”.  I am 
drawn by their mastery itself, as well as to the situation of risk, as well as to the dramatic 
situation in which their characters are caught up.  A whole range of these directed actions, 
in other words, is informed firstly by expert-intuitive processes whose particularity is specific 
to individual as well as shared experience, and by a taste for speculation and invention, and 
thirdly by the deliberative processes specific to the developing mise en scène. 
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I fall. This complex action, born of a senseless contingency, is undirected ‘in my own world’ 
– which may be where the sense of failure comes from.  I am lost.  From an unfelt weight 
that seems to hold me to the earth, to the experience of weightlessness:  where are my feet 
– where is my spine – and my head?!  Where?  I am still, there, on the floor, my head 
butted up against the base of the wooden door - as though waiting for something else to 
happen, but in fact I have fallen.  My face, I imagine after the event, is chalky white, my 
mouth open, my brows dark and my eyes slits, the scene around me blacks and greys.  I am 
surely grotesque - but isn’t this observation the result of hindsight and its reinventions?  I 
have fallen.  I see nothing and I am unseen.  Self-regard falls away, for the extended 
moments of falling.  I whimper.  I am waiting now, because I have fallen, for the world to 
slow and stop, to return to its everyday hold on me.  Onstage, performance itself holds the 
performers, in a webbing of organised energies, as do the different dimensions of the 
multiply constructed space, plus the notion of event, and the positionality and direction of 
the work.  
For some of us, at least, the memory of falling resonates; the recall of almost falling, of 
having avoided falling, the balance achieved over time (from early infancy, as dancer Wendy 
Houston has shown in falling differently to the stage on the basis of a progressively 
developing infantile command of her musclesxiv) and with care and attention, similarly 
resonates; and in Bourdet’s work on Claudel, I would argue that that memory is figured, in 
terms of both the mastered space and the explicit demonstration of mastery of 
performance.   
 
O!  Isn’t this, in fact, the memory of falling!  Isn’t that what I’m actually writing about here?  
I am haunted by the memory of falling.  But the memory of falling is surely nothing like 
falling.  I don’t recall the initial impetus.  I was caught up, it seems to me, in Massumi’s 
“pure, senseless contingency” – although unlike Roland Barthes, I did not lose my life: I 
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suddenly lose my uprightness, feet gone from under me, and the everyday-familiar tilts.  But 
then gravity, and all that is grave about it, takes over (takes me over).  I recall a movement 
forward, down, a rush of air – I shout “I am falling!” to no-one.  With nothing to hold on to, 
no toeholds, objects to clasp at or to bump into, to slow or stop the inexorable downward 
movement.  The revenge of gravity?  My brain is shaken within the bony container, and in 
the downward movement knowledge of what is happening comes looping between brain, 
body and environment.  (“Brain and body communicate neurologically and chemically”, 
writes John Protevi, “in forming ‘somatic markers’, which correlate or tag changes in the 
characteristic profile of body-world interactions, which provoke them.” (402)). 
 
In my own experience, the memory of having fallen is more like a memory of landing, 
broken, somewhere.  As though my experience of falling is actually of a ‘having fallen’.  
Clunk.  Crumple.  It is on the ground that I ask myself: where are my legs?  Where is my 
head?  Suddenly – again! - a Lacanian “body in bits and pieces”xv?  My helpless words 
perform that apparently constitutive disarray of the human.  What happened?  Where are 
you?  Help me! 
 
But what does this (falling) have to do with performance or performances?  Nothing -
absolutely nothing.  The expert performance of falling has nothing at all to do with 
Massumi’s “pure senseless contingency” (although perhaps “senselessness” and the impact 
of contingency might be replicated, in the staging?).  The one is not daily, although it is 
banal; nor, however, is its other extra-dailyxvi.  Performance of falling, in dance, onstage, 
theatrical or choreographic, is, quite succinctly, a not falling that takes place within the 
circumstances that allow the performance of falling, but prevent its actual realisation.  The 
‘somatic markers’, “which correlate or tag changes in the characteristic profile of body-world 
interactions” (Protevi 402) radically differ between my falling and a falling-performed in the 
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context of a staged dramatic writing. That falling-performed is in fact a not-falling.  Non-
actualisation on the part of the expert performer; actualisation on the part of dramatic 
character – but to what (dramatic) effect?  The enabling/withholding circumstances specific 
to expert practice include the set-up specific to performance-making (the dispositif, in J.-F. 
Lyotardxvii), the mastery of the practitioners involved, and the varying expectations of the 
different participants involved – not to mention health and safety!  The present participle, 
falling, is widely used in the issue of Performance Research that takes the notion as its 
primary focus, but ‘falling’, in terms of expert-creative performance terms, is no more and 
no less than an abstraction.  The expert seems to me to identify a field or fields of practices 
– including the practices of spectating – that constitutively avoid that “pure senseless 
contingency” identified by Massumi (1998).  Falling, in the everyday, interrupts the subject’s 
control; it is the antithesis, as a consequence, of creative decision-making; it suspends the 
“instrumental reasoning” (Massumi, ibid) of the expert-creative decision-maker; it breaks 
with the “abstract mode …of possibility” (ibid) that the expert decision-maker in 
performance exercises – to proclaim her or his performance-making expertise, in the event, 
and, in terms of theatricality, to ostend it.  
Falling is not  performing falling.  Do you remember not falling, in the performance space, in 
its own terms, or do we call the memory of not falling something else altogether – because 
it feels different?  Feeling (differently) but not falling, in performance terms, displays and 
indeed ‘speaks of’ – if you like linguistic metaphor - mastery, the mastery of what is in fact a 
complex abstraction that derives, in turn, from the command of a particular system or 
systems of bodily practices, of a discipline.  Mastery, from the early 13C Old French maistrie, 
suggests “superiority”, “victory”, and, from the mid-1660s, “intellectual command”xviii.  In 
terms then of mastery of a performance discipline or disciplines – I can think of no useful 
way here to set the notion of a performance discipline aside – we might still want to ask 
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how it is that actual mastery evidenced by performers at work, can signal, to onlookers, its 
thematic opposite?   
 
Mastery in performance-making – along with expertise, professionalism and discipline –
despite its status as constitutive of expert performance practices across the full range of 
performance-making in the public sphere, is relatively speaking under-theorised in 
Performance Studies.  Its vital metadiscourse and the wording of its links with expert 
performance-making practices (metapractice) are largely absent from the weighty body of 
Performance Studies writing – with the exception perhaps of certain areas of Dance Studies 
and more recently of writing concerned with certain established modes of performer 
trainingxix.  A notable exception in the early 1990s was provided by the all too brief 
illustrated commentary in Barba and Savarese’s The Secret Art of the Performer: A 
Dictionary of Theatre Anthropologyxx.  Despite these rudiments, it remains the case that the 
writing in these instances is rarely concerned with expert-creative decision-making processes 
themselves.  Yet some basic elements relating to an expert decision-making metapractice 
(production of the metadiscourse is one of a range of metapractices) do exist: in Lyotardxxi, 
1991, the philosopher observed that a growing auto-reflexivity is a vital aspect of the 
acquisition of expertise.   
 
Mastery, in these terms, in particular in the case of the visual arts and performance-making, 
is auto-reflexive, self-ostending (from the Latin ostendere to show, exhibit, to manifest), and 
it tends to be mutually recognised amongst expert practitioners across disciplinary fields of  
practice, whereas theoretical writers’ recognition of performance mastery may well depend 
on their own engagement with the outcome of making processes, rather than those 
processes and the judgements of taste and value implicit to them, themselves.   
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In the Inhuman, Lyotard was particularly interested in the place and role of memory in 
knowledge, in particular in the context of the acquisition of expertise.  Remembering, in that 
context, he observed, “also entails the engagement,” in the practitioner, “of a meta-
practice,” which transcends the immediate situation of experimentation, experience and 
recall: the expert practitioner involved does not ‘simply’ react to present stimuli, nor is her or 
his action ‘impulsive’ or ‘instinctive’: the impulsive person, in Bergson on memory, “suspends 
her or his consciousness and stays within the unreflective domain of automatism”.xxii  
Rather, the developing expert practitioner’s engagement, which is likely to be strongly 
intuitive, involves an awareness of the existence of a whole system of possible responses, in 
which terms the preferred and apparently immediate reaction is rapidly tested before it is 
applied.  The acquisition of performance mastery, in the performer, is revealed in that 
performer’s evident (and evidenced) ability to run rapidly through a range of options (and 
the systems to which they belong) that apply or might apply to the set-up of performance-
making in question, and to test the options as rapidly in the set-up (or complex of 
overlapping set-ups) that prevails.  These processes of rapid and experimental engagement, 
in the expert practitioner, are largely invisible to the present non-participant onlooker, but 
tend to be wholly invisible even to expert spectating and critical engagement with outcome. 
Performing “not falling”, in such a performance-making set-up, provides a sharp delineation 
of a double expertise (an assemblage: expertise in the making, shared with the expert 
metteur en scène,  coupled with expertise in the performing); and on this basis I would 
want to distinguish between Ixion’s archetypal fall into the flaming depths, represented in 
Fig 1, above, where the expertise is that of the painter (whereas the artist’s model is likely 
to have been “modelled” by her or his painter, who alone can see the subject from the 
appropriate perspective); the tightrope walker, in Fig 2, whose professional skills emerge 
from training and are apparently undisputed, and that of the professional performer 
depicted in Fig 3.  The double expertise of the performance professionals – we see this 
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equally in the work of choreographer and dancer - merges the expert-intuitivity of the 
performers with the deliberative processingxxiii specific to mise en scène.  But expertise itself 
is largely absent, as a topic, from the expert (Performance Studies) writer’s account for 
reasons that have held my thought processes in suspension for more than a decade: 
expertise, in my own (suspended) account, involves catalysis between the expert 
practitioner’s singular experience, on the one hand, and on the other, her or his 
experimentation (three nouns beginning with the morpheme ‘exper-‘), in the set-ups specific 
to expert creative performance decision-making.  In its singularity it can seem to be 
resistant to written discursivisation, to involve a first-person embodied and/or verbal account 
or accounts that might seem in turn, on that first-person and singularising basis, to be 
resistant to the terms and modes of written discursive generalisation.  Expertise, in other 
words, within the spectrum of expert-creative decision-making by the performer, tends to 
include the highly-skilled, the singular, the tentative, and the speculative.xxiv 
Bourdet’s performers’ auto-reflexive mastery, briefly depicted in Fig 3, above, and in Figs 7 
and 8 below, is discussed in A-F Benhamou and I. Massenet, 1982, Alternatives théâtrales 
(no.12)xxv.  Bourdet is quoted in terms of the ‘theatricality’ he requires of his performers, 
whose rapidity of choice in making and rehearsing the piece I have elsewhere described as 
expert-intuitive.xxvi  Expert-intuitive processing responds rapidly in the sorts of contexts that 
trigger it, and it responds – usefully or not - to a number of factors present in the set-up 
particular to expert/professional staging in general and the set-up specific to the individual 
production.  Expert-intuitivity is not, however, “fast and frugal”, as some researchers into 
intuitive decision-making have claimed.  Instead more recent researchxxvii argues that 
intuitive decision-making, not least by professionals at work, involves and activates the “rich 
knowledge” specific to the discipline and to the individual performer’s history of 
experimentation and experience, which that individual has internalisedxxviii.  It has nothing at 
all to do with impulse, with the “instinctive”, nor is it located on the other side of the 
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rational; nor indeed, as I have indicated elsewhere, is the expert-intuitive “just intuitive”xxix. 
On the contrary, expert-intuitive mastery has internalised performer-specific and 
performance-specific analysis and deliberation, as this has been experienced by the 
individual practitioner, generally in a collaborative set-up; it involves a dynamic and often 
unstable feedback loop it is key to decision-making in professional practice; it has 
internalised aspects of performance meta-practice developed in the context of different 
stagings.  
It has internalised experimentation and the outcome of professional experience, where each 
of these has been experienced in the first person, has been personalised, and is stored 
speculatively, by which I mean that it is likely to be dynamic, to feel unfinished, and to 
remain open to renewed experimentation in new performance-making circumstances and 
set-ups.  Where the practitioner’s work is subject to mise en scène, to a directorial 
intervention, the knowledge-practices engaged remain, as far as I can tell, for the performer 
concerned, not just speculative, singularised, tentative, but also more or less open to the 
deliberative processes specific to mise en scène. 
On these bases, every expert-intuitive decision taken by the performer-practitioner has 
swiftly engaged with a system of performance possibilities, and with a network of systems 
which include possible actions, a calculation, initially implicit, of affective potential, material 
and interpersonal positionality and relationality (specific in part to an anticipated 
onlooker/audience), and so on and so forth.  That expert-intuitivity tends, as I suggest 
above, in performance-making that employs a directorial figure as well as expert performers, 
to require the confirmation afforded by deliberative input and/or modification specific to 
mise en scène, and, finally – and importantly, at least as far as the so-called “observational” 
research strategies are concerned -  it tends to be invisible to the expert spectator, for the 
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simple reason that expert-intuitivity is involved in tentative processes of invention, prior to 
the development of the overall performance event as such.  
 
Fig 7, Turelure, Christian Blanc in Le Pain dur, 1984. 
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In Bourdet’s mise en scène Christian Blanc suddenly and literally climbs the walls and their 
fittings and in my memory at least, even runs across the ceiling, and hangs there, not 
falling, and in not falling that performer both displays performance mastery – its 
“superiority” and “victory” over everyday obedience to the force of gravity - and in so doing 
equally invokes its everyday opposite.  By climbing and not falling they transform the nature 
of the built everyday space as construct: why would a bookcase not be a ladder, a mantel 
not a window ledge, out of reach of the other, always at risk, but equally a showcase, and a 
springboard, with considerable downward potential?  A ceiling not a floor, to scurry along – 
the verb suggesting rodents rather than the (formerly) well-born and propertied. 
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Fig 8: Lumir, Brigitte Rouän 
Does this gravity-flouting control signal an “intellectual command” of bodily practices, or is 
this notion, from the 1660s, superseded by the terminology specific to the so-called 
“cognitive turn”xxx?  Certainly, in Lyotard’s terms, above, the complex action performed – 
climbing, not falling - is doubled by the metapractice of control: that control is ostended as 
such thereby displaying the theatricality required of his performers by Bourdet, within the 
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set he has designed, and in relation to the peculiarities of Claudel’s text.  But expertly 
performing falling, by expertly ‘not falling’, within the given dramatic set-up, flags up the 
same challenge to gravity itself: for Claudel, speaking metaphorically, the majority of his 
dramatic characters in Le Pain dur have already fallen.  This is who they are in a world that 
has similarly already fallen - with all of the implications and associations that apply.  The 
elevation of the ceilings, and the presence of the staircase constructed onstage together 
gesture upwards, signalling a relatively glorious past - for those who had the right and 
ability to climb - but that elevation has always already suggested the possibility of falling 
(not least in the largely Catholic France).  Ascent, in that past, was normalised for a specific 
class, but that ascent was always shadowed by the possibility of falling: gravity retained its 
everyday force and its potential, but in Bourdet’s staging that potential is overruled by the 
performers’ expertise: mastery allows an affective performance of falling that avoids the real 
effects of a body plummeting through space, and landing - hard.  
 
The control remains, and in Bourdet’s work the expertise (metapractice) is ostended. 
Despite all appearances to the contrary, a bracketed ‘falling’, for the expert performer, 
involves no loss of control whatsoever.  That mastery depends, absolutely, on the individual 
performer’s prior experience, whether that experience has been derived from strongly 
codified performance traditions or those specific to performance modes which explicitly 
encourage individual invention.  In Bourdet’s work the performers’ mastery enables some of 
them to laugh in the face of a gravity they exploit to their own performance ends.  It is self-
exposing, and – theatrically - it demands to be watched (twice); and, as Eugenio Barba 
wrote in Theatre Anthropology: First Hypothesis (published in English language translation in 
1991), with reference in particular to “Oriental traditions” and to “Occidental theatre” (p.34), 
it is those performers’ “precarious balance” that is likely to catch and then hold an onlooker’s 
attention – even if, in research conducted between 1980 and 1990, Barba wrote that it was 
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only in “strongly codified techniques [such] as mime … or classical dance” that performers’ 
“bodies appear to have been broken and then reformed”, thereby drawing and holding the 
onlooker’s eye.  In the section entitled “Balance”, including reference to the so-called “extra-
daily…” (34-53), Barba raises the notion that a “whole series of tensions” prevents the 
tightrope walker from falling. It seems to me to be likely that the tightrope walker, whether 
it is a matter of the Italian acrobatic dancer, Sacchi “at London’s Covent Garden in 1816”, or 
of Phillipe Petit’s not falling, in his notorious walk between the Twin Towers in 1974, is 
genuinely exceptional, and that it is the singular performer’s outstanding mastery of physical 
and psychological tensions, in a context of acute risk, that attracts our gaze – if, indeed 
some of us can bear to watch, can bear to be bound-in.   
 
The empathetic/sympathetic “phenomenological response” that might allow me to “project 
[myself] into the story and share in the triumph” (31: my emphasis), is missing from my 
engagement, but so too is the mastery.  I have found that there is no acquisition of mastery 
in falling, nor is there the possibility of a re-membering (a putting the members back) in 
Lyotard’s terms.  My first-person wording, above, is an invention, a line strung across a 
space that is far from empty.  In the absence of a choreographer, the knowledge-dilemma 
remains: how did I revolve, on the way down, so that from an upright, standing position, I 
end up, two flights down, head-first, against the hallway door?  Perhaps a clue to the 
knowledge dilemmas engaged throughout this paper can be found after all in Protevi – who 
writes however in the context of a de-subjectivized male street violence rather than with 
regard to the acquisition of mastery in an individual expert practitioner whose acquisition 
continues to be felt in first-person terms: in the acquisition of expertise, I am arguing, 
“[b]rain and body [do indeed] communicate neurologically and chemically in forming 
‘somatic markers’”xxxi, which are felt to be “’…me feeling this way’” (402).  But in the chaos 
of my falling that neurological and chemical communication fails, fizzes and short-circuits, 
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and in the absence of retainable somatic markers, there is no such correlation of “changes 
in the characteristic profile of body-world interactions, which provoke them”.  Falling, in the 
case of “pure senseless contingency”, is not simply counter-intuitive, as is the extended 
sequence of movements that take me – how? - to the floor: the lived world around me 
comes unstuck – I come unstuck – and it seems, in passing, that stair edge and bannister 
strike at me because their world, too, is shocked and shaken by the chaos of my 
movements.   
 
In contrast, Christian Blanc’s climb and eventual staged ‘fall’ in Bourdet’s scenographic 
construct are expert-intuitively inventive, masterly and repeatable, with full knowledge of 
cause and considerable understanding of effect/affect: the somatic markers correlate with or 
tag changes in the profile characteristic of his professional expertise, within the (body-world) 
performance-making set-up with which he operates; nonetheless, it seems to me that he is 
likely, if called upon to do so, to evaluate his own expert knowledge practices in affective 
terms, as felt, speculative, creative and systematically in need of feedback – hence 
relationally-defined and eternally open to individual experience.  
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